Private and secure communications can be vital for certain applications, for example secure bidding, ecommerce, and online bank transactions. However, it is impossible to carry out private conversations in the open tuple-space model, despite it being a popular coordination modelfor distributed, heterogeneous systems, where agents can communicate via a common data space without having to know each other's identity, or having to arrange for a definite rendezvous. In this paper, we present an algorithm for establishing private communications in tuple-space systems using capabilities. In view of the fact that open systems need to be scalable, capabilities may provide a finer control to the loose control coordination of tuple-space systems whilst maintaining theirflexibility. As capabilities can only refer to uniquely identifiable objects, we have introduced the concept of multicapabilities-capabilities for groups of unnamed objects to be applied to nameless tuples.
Introduction
The tuple-space model, also known as LINDA [5] is a popular paradigm for coordination in open distributed systems, where agents or active entities may join or leave the system at will. The main component of the model is the shared communication medium, called the tuple-space (TS) where data (tuples) are written into, and retrieved from. The retrieval operations, destructive and non-destructive read, block if no tuple matching the specified template is available. Tuples are sequences of actuals, e.g. (9 , 'x' ); while templates are sequences of formals, e.g. (?int, ?char). The tuples are retrieved associatively and asynchronously in a non-deterministic fashion: the retrieval operation may return any matching tuple; and, if a number of agents are waiting for a tuple of the same template, a matching tuple, when available, may be given to any one of them. Interacting via the TS where there is no direct communication between them, the communicating agents are decoupled in name, space and time they need not know each other's identity, nor co-exist at the same time in order to communicate with each other providing a flexible coordination mecha- popularity is shown in its commercial variants, such as Sun's JavaSpaces [4] and IBM's TSpaces [18] .
Unfortunately, in spite of the above attractive properties, concerns have been raised with regard to LINDA'S loose control. Many solutions have been proposed, at the expense of LINDA'S principal advantages: it is difficult to obtain the optimum balance between flexibility and tighter control. Motivated by this, we extend work on capability-based systems [3, 17] to provide a finer control, without losing the flexibility of LINDA.
One example of the loose control in LINDA is that it is impossible to have private communications in the system. The private channel protocol has been proposed by Wood [17] using access control lists-(ACL-) like attributes. As it has been established that capabilities offer more flexibility compared to ACLs [3, 12, 13] , in this paper we demonstrate that a private channel can also be established using capabilities. Furthermore, with the help of the combination operations such as sum, explicit garbage collection of tuples can be performed.
Capability-based systems
Examples of early attempts at improving LINDA using a capability-like mechanism is Pinakis's Joyce-LINDA [11] , and Law-Governed LINDA (LGL) [8] . Joyce whether it is a TS, a field type, a type signature, or other objects), the name of the TS (of which the object is a member), a set of rights, and a cryptographic hash function to minimise forgery. Like ours, a capability in VLOS acts as a 'handle' to the object it is associated with. Our multicapabilities, however, yield more flexibility in the sense that they are not associated with a TS-they can be used with any TS as long as the user possesses the capability for the target TS. Furthermore, the combination calculus (see Section 2.1) of capabilities gives an added advantage for our model to maintain control while being flexible.
A pIKLAIM [7] capability is a pair that represents the operation allowed on a pattern of the matching (target) tuple, whereas our multicapability is a triple that provides extra features of partitioning via tags, to limit and control agents' accesses, as well as the combination calculus to further enrich the model. pLKLAIM uses its type system to enforce access control. Unlike our capability model that uses dynamic checking, pLKLAIM relies on both static and dynamic checking.
In the systems mentioned above, capabilities are mainly discussed as an access control mechanism for security purposes, some with the assistance of cryptography, as in [11, 1, 2] . pIKLAIM for instance, emphasises security policies: an agent may have 'knowledge' of a location name even though it does not have a capability to it. We are concentrating on the functional properties of capabilities as 'visibility' filters-agents can only know about objects for which they hold a capability, and the capability makes visible a subset of the operations available for that object's type. This scheme enables a more refined control over agents' actions (not limited to access control only) on objects in the system, and facilitates certain aspects of coordination, such as resource management [14] .
Multicapabilities
A capability is a 'ticket' which specifies what action(s) an agent is allowed to invoke on a certain object [10] . However, unlike ACLs, capabilities can only be applied to named objects, such as TSs, but not the nameless tuples. To overcome this, we have introduced multicapabilities [15] , i.e. capabilities for a class of objects: whereas a permission in a uni-capability allows an action on the object it refers to, a multicapability allows the action to be performed on an element of the class. Throughout this paper, we shall use the term 'capability' to refer to capabilities in general, and the terms 'uni-capability' or 'multicapability' accordingly when referring to a specific class.
Extending uni-capabilities which are pairs of object identifier o, and rights ( [ o, { d, r, w } ] ), each multicapability is a triple of a unique (unforgeable) identifier, the template of tuples it refers to, and a set of rights, e.g. a multicapability for a template of two integers is [ Law Governed LINDA (LGL) [8] , for example, enables private conversation between agents by means of some global law. Every communication between agents is checked against the law, and only those that do not violate the law are allowed to be completed. For private message passing, the tuple needs to have an additional field (a flag), and the law requires that all messages containing the flag to also specify the sender and the receiver's identities: an agent can only send a message tuple with its own identification (thus guaranteeing no forgery), and only the agent named as the receiver in the message is allowed to retrieve it. However a global law scales badly, not to mention the cost in enforcement: a copy of the law needs to be executed every time a message is sent/received. SECOS's rather complicated secure channels protocol [16] uses (symmetric and asymmetric) keys and object locks. This requires the initiator of the communication to have knowledge of the other agent's public key. The initiating agent establishes the channel by specifying the channel identifier and its own public key, locked with the other agent's public key, and whole object is then digitally signed using the initiator's private key. If the other agent is willing to accept the connection, it will then send an acknowledgement message to the initiator containing the channel identifier and the agent's public key, signed with its private key. Unfortunately, keyrelated control does not discriminate the type of access, e.g. for read-only, but not remove, operation.
The original LINDA model consists of a single space to act as the coordination medium, which is quite unfortunate for some applications as there is no privacy in communicating via the public space. Having multiple TSs [6] at first seems to solve this problem, by providing a means to have a TS (other than the universal TS) known only to the two agents concerned. However, this does not solve the problem in open systems as the reference to this TS has to be passed (in a tuple) from one agent to another via a TS that can be globally accessed by both (and all) agents, e.g. the UTS, thus exposing the reference tuple to other agents as well-defeating the purpose of having a 'private' TS.
Attaching access control attributes to objects (TSs and tuples) provides a finer control to overcome this problem 0-7803-9521-2/06/$20.00 §2006 IEEE. [17] . Forming the basis for the protocol presented (in Section 3.1) in this paper, the private channel protocol in [17] uses ACL-like attributes as the controlling mechanism. The attribute set of each object is composed of two groups: the former indicates the operations permitted to the object's creator, while the latter controls those of other agents. Therefore, the object's creator can restrict the attributes to prevent tuples from being removed, as well as preventing leaking TS references (by limiting access to write-only privilege, for instance). The initiator produces a read-only tuple containing the reference to a write-only TS, inviting other agents to engage in private conversations with it. The interested agents can then safely send the initiator their own private spaces via the write-only TS (using the previously supplied reference).
We are looking at a more distributed mechanism in controlling objects' visibility to agents, which is not a built-in mechanism akin to the laws in LGL. Capabilities are more suitable for open distributed systems compared to ACLs and global laws, as they themselves are distributed in the sense that the controlling attributes are held by the agents, rather than being attached to objects; they can be transferred from one agent to another; they accommodate user-defined rights, thus may be dynamically changed; and agents may join and leave the system simply by requesting (and possessing) appropriate capabilities. We therefore implemented the protocol in [17] using capabilities, rather than ACL-like attributes.
Setting up private channels using capabilities
To establish a private channel, the communicating agents need to have a reference (capability) to the private TS. Suppose that agent A wishes to invite other agents to engage in a private conversation. A may create a private TS for this purpose. As the newly created TS is known only to the creator, A needs to pass the capability for the private TS to the other agent, say B, via a TS which is accessible by B, i.e. the UTS. Even though the capability tuple is written using cc and is safe from unwanted removal, the UTS, unfortunately, is also accessible by all agents in the system, which means that the capability tuple's 'secrecy' cannot be guaranteed: it cannot be removed, but it certainly can be read by all. This calls for an additional phase to complete the protocol (Figure 1) .
A needs another TS to act as a 'letter box' for the other agent(s) to put the capability for their private TS into, safely concealed from the others.
A creates a letter-box TS, called contact (line 1 in Agent A's code in Table 1) , and automatically gets a capability for it with full rights, before restricting the permission on (a copy of the capability for) contact to allow write-only (line 2). It then passes the restricted capability for contact (in a tuple) via the UTS (line 4). Since the tuple is written using the universal cc (identifled by N), other agents, e.g. B can read it. As cc does not grant permission for destructive read, the tuple is safe from being removed by any agent (and consequently depriving other interested agents of it), including A. In order to remove the tuple later, A must request, and acquire a multicapability for a capability type (uniquely identified with a, stored in cl) (line 3), which it then uses to write the tuple, along with cc in a sum operation (+). Consequently, any agent holding either multicapability may access it (subject to the rights granted by each multicapability). as secure bidding. A bidding process begins by an agent (the client) advertising its desire to employ another agent to carry out a task on the client's behalf. A group of interested agents (potential providers) then submit their bids, in the hope of being selected to perform the task. As there is obviously a competition involved among them, it is essential that the bids are kept secret from the other bidders. In the conventional point-to-point communication, assuming the security of the channels, there is no concern for the secrecy of the bids. There is no such guarantee, however, in the TS model, as all communications are done via a publicly accessible data space, hence the need for the establishment of private channels, as presented above.
Taking advantage of the general broadcast communication in LINDA, the client (labelled 'C' in Figure 2) can advertise the task by posting one copy of the announcement into the UTS, without having to send the announcement messages to all potential providers (labelled 'P1', 'P2', and 'P3'), as in the point-to-point communication model. The advertisement includes: -the task description and specification, -the capabilities for the letter-box (contact) TS into which bids are to be deposited, and -the multicapability for a bid: a class representing a bid form, which contains the bid specification, such as the description of the expected form of a bid, what information must be provided with the bid, and so on. These information will be used by the client to compare the bids from different potential providers. Prior to advertising the task and inviting biddings, the client must first create the contact TS, request a multicapability for b id, to disallow destructive read and write: the agents obtaining this copy of c_task cannot remove the task announcement tuple, nor can they write (produce) another task announcement tuple using the same multicapability, thus impersonating the client. The (restricted copy of the) multicapability tuple is then passed to potential bidders via the UTS, using the sum of cc and c 1 (with the same purpose as c 1 in Section 3.1 above). Reading the tuple containing multicapability c_t a s k' , the other agents can then proceed to read (but not remove) the task advertisement tuple posted by the client into the UTS. The interested agents may then submit their bids via contact using the multicapability c bid, both capabilities extracted from the advertisement tuple. The bids will be contained in a bid tuple, along with a private channel reference (capability mychn) for further communications, in the event of a successful bid:
contact.write(c_bid<mybid,mychannel>); 0-7803-9521-2/06/$20.00 §2006 IEEE.
As the bids are sent to the client via the write-only contact, no agents other than the client can read them. This eliminates the danger of leaking bids. Unlike the secure bidding policy in the Law Governed Interaction [9] , our algorithm does not require any global law to be abided by the agents, nor any notion of agent identity need to be incorporated, unless they are absolutely necessary for the application. Therefore, the nameuncoupling property of LINDA is preserved.
Conclusions
Although LINDA Much work has been carried out to impose more control, at the expense of its most attractive feature flexibility. Capabilities, on the other hand, provide the mechanism to finely control a system without losing the flexibility essential in an open environment. In this paper, we have demonstrated that private channels can be established in a LINDA-like capability-based system. Indeed, with the establishment of private channels using capabilities and multicapabilities, agents can have secure and private conversations while still enjoying the advantages of the TS model's flexibility they can still benefit from LINDA'S general broadcast communication; they do not need to know each other's identity (unless it is absolutely necessary); and no global law needs to be enforced. Furthermore, with capability expressions (for combination operations), a richer and finer visibility control may be achieved.
